Youth development and women empowerment in an evolving post-apartheid South African developmental state
Vusi Gumede, PhD - Associate Professor: Development Studies, University of Johannesburg

** Contributions from Gcino Mlaba are acknowledged. This paper is not to be quoted without the permission of the corresponding author (gumede.vusi@gmail.com)

Abstract

This paper interrogates South Africa’s evolving developmental state as far as youth and women are concerned. The developmental state is defined, amongst others, within the context of Johnson’s (1982) ‘plan-rational state’, Evan’s (1995) notion of ‘embedded autonomy’, Leftwich’s (1995) ‘model’ of a developmental state, Mkandawire’s (2001) ‘ideology-structure nexus’, Cummings and Nørgaard’s (2004) four dimensions of state capacity – a number of South African scholars on ‘developmental state’, such as Mhone (2004) and Edigheji (2005), are also used to formulate a working definition for a developmental state. The overall conclusion is that women have largely benefited from the post-apartheid transformation effort while youth are the biggest losers. The paper argues that, although South Africa has clearly articulated development objectives, the fundamental hindrances to more substantive development outcomes are the economy, the labour market and the inadequate capacity of the state as well as policy related constraints.

Key words: developmental state, poverty, state capacity, youth development, women empowerment, economic inclusion, human development, welfare, South Africa
1. Introduction

This paper attempts to examine the degree to which South Africa’s development (socio-economic) policy making apparatus and implementation capacity are indeed in line with her aspirations to be an effective developmental state. An analysis of the impact of socio-economic policies targeting youth and women, as broadly vulnerable members of society, is undertaken to establish some preliminary conclusions on the fledging South African developmental state. The first section of the paper arrives at some definition of a developmental state and discusses South Africa’s historical development paradigm and the state’s capacity to achieve its objectives. The second section examines socio-economic policies targeting youth and women. It also presents a brief human development perspective to South Africa’s socio-economic transformation agenda. The third section of the paper concludes.

2. A development state – A brief description

The idea of a ‘developmental state’ has dominated development discourse, especially following the rapid economic growth of East Asian countries (such as Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea). Yet it appears that there is no single definition of a developmental state.

Early studies, however, suggest certain key characteristics of successful developmental states through the examination of their politics and state capacity (Myrdal, 1970). Such studies came up with key features of two types of states: a ‘strong’ state and a ‘weak’ state. A ‘strong state’ was characterised as one led by a purposeful and determined developmental elite, who establish its legitimacy through its ability to achieve sustained economic growth. Such a state is supported by a technically competent and capable administration which implements economic policies wisely and effectively. An underlying factor for the early developmental states was the autonomy/independence of the state from social forces (corporate and civil society), which
enabled the state to devise and implement long-term economic policies without being sidetracked by private interests (Leftwich, 1995).

Gumede (2008: 9) defined a developmental state ‘[as] the one that is active in pursuing its agenda, working with social partners, and has the capacity and is appropriately organised for its predetermined developmental objectives’.

In addition, Mkandawire (2001) argues that developmental states are ‘social construct[s]’ by different role-players in a particular society, which is related to Onis’ (1991) argument that the East Asian model of a developmental state is the product of unique historical circumstances. In fact, Castells (2010) identified three ‘cultural areas’ in the case of East Asia: the Japanese communitarian approach, the Korean patrimonial logic and the Taiwanese patrilineal logic. Johnson (1982) saw the developmental state in Japan as epitomised by a ‘plan rational state’ where ‘the politicians reign and the state bureaucrats rule’ - the ‘plan rational state’ shaped economic development as it intervened in the development process and established ‘substantive social and economic goals’.

Further, Mhone (2004) suggests that one needs to look at whether the state is developmental in its thinking and action and also whether it is organised in a way that ‘developmentalism’ is feasible. Mhone defines developmentalism as a ‘proactive role of the state in pursuing and defining a developmental vision to be attained in the long-term, in coordinating economic activities and steering them toward desired outcomes, mobilizing and synergizing class and social forces in support of the developmental agenda’. In a sense this is similar to Mkandawire’s (2001) differentiation between two components of a developmental state; the ideological and the structural.

Another point around the characteristics of developmental states is that they are traditionally associated with economic development. Bagchi (2000), for instance, defines a developmental state as ‘a state that puts economic development as the top priority of governmental policy and is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal’. Economic development is largely associated with industrialization and/or industrial policy. This perspective seems to feature prominently in definitions of developmental states by leading scholars in this field [see for instance Johnson (1982; 1999), Amsden (1989) and Evans (1995; 2007)].
A different perspective, which emphasizes broader development, is presented by other leading scholars. However, it appears that all scholars highlight similar characteristics of the developmental states. For instance, although Leftwich’s (1995) definition of a developmental state seems to be focusing on broader development his model contains characteristics similar to Evan’s (1995) notion of ‘embedded autonomy’.

As a state that has unusually and boldly declared its ambitions to be a developmental state, South Africa has certainly opened itself up to much scrutiny as to the suitability of its leading political and development paradigm as well as her state capacity. The next section explores this further; looking at the primary factors that have shaped the development paradigm of the African National Congress (the ruling political party in government since 1994) and the dynamics of the organization and capacity of the South African developmental state.

This section will be followed by a case study analysis of the status of youth and women in South Africa so as to arrive at some preliminary conclusion on the impact of the country’s socio-economic and development policies. It appears that women, unlike youth, have largely benefited from the post apartheid transformation effort. Indications are that the greatest challenge is the stagnant nature of South Africa’s economy and the impermeability of the labour market. The paper attributes the failure to both the state and the private sector, over and above what appears to be labour market failure and a policy chasm.

3. A paradigm of South Africa’s developmental state in the making

As Onis (1991) argued in the case of East Asian developmental states that they were shaped by their historical circumstances, the African National Congress aspires to ‘build a developmental state that is shaped by the history and socio-economic dynamics of South African society’ within the ‘National Democratic Revolution’ paradigm (ANC, 2007: 5). The ANC’s ideology is clear in many government documents and political discourse (such as ANC Strategy and Tactics 2007, National General Council 2005, 52nd National Conference, ANC manifesto for the 2009 general elections). This is one aspect of a developmental state that Mkandawire (2001) alludes to. The ANC’s policy discussion documents, for example, highlight that South Africa’s developmental state will be informed by and customised to respond to local realities, such as the history of
colonialism. These emphasise state capacity to intervene in the economy in the interests of higher rates of growth, national development and social inclusion.

Arguably, the ANC’s approach to economic transformation proceeds from the understanding that socio-economic development cannot emerge spontaneously from the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. It is necessary for the state to play a central and strategic role in shaping the contours of socio-economic development. It is in this regard that the ruling party – the ANC – has (been attempting to) mobilize/d social partners/all sectors of society to take part in policy formulation and planning, and directing society’s resources towards common national goals. The construction of a South African model is intended to restructure the economy in such a way that it will ensure broadened participation by black people; expand beneficiation efforts; allow for higher rates of export, increased taxation for redistribution, strengthened competition authorities and so forth.

The second aspect, the structure, is clear in the detail of what the ANC deems a developmental state to be. The revised Strategy and Tactics (ANC 2007) says that the developmental state would have the capacity to intervene in the economy; implement social programmes that address unemployment, poverty and underdevelopment and also have the capacity to mobilise the people. With some exceptions, the ANC seems to be adopting Leftwich’s (1995) model of developmental states and combining that with Evans’ (1995) ‘embedded autonomy’ recommendation and trying to ensure the ‘ideology-structure nexus’ of Mkandawire (2001).

From Leftwich’s model, the following components seem to feature in the South African case: determined developmental elite; relative autonomy; the effective management of non-state economic interests; and legitimacy and performance. With regard to ‘ideology-structure nexus’, the attributes that the ANC lists as the main attributes of the (envisaged) South African developmental state include issues such as the proposed strategic orientation (which emphasizes people-centered and people-driven development) and capacity to lead the definition of an overarching developmental agenda and the mobilization of people around it.
The ANC appears to also draw from Cummings and Nørgaard’s (2004) dimensions of state capacity. It highlights organizational capacity (such as organization of the state) and technical capacity (such as implementation capacity). It seems to have also tried to apply notions of ‘state-structure nexus’ and ‘institutional coherence’ that Robinson and White (1998) see as important institutional attributes of a democratic developmental state.

Weiss (2000) had a model of a developmental state which highlights three factors that determine the extent to which a state is developmental. It would seem that her model suggests that South Africa is developmental. Firstly, South Africa has demonstrated a commitment to create a developmental state as demonstrated above. Second, it could be argued that the political and technocratic elite have maintained their independence and have been relatively insulated from external influence. Thirdly, that the government appears connected, to some extent, to the private sector. Government has employed various strategies to promote economic development, including forging a synergistic and co-operative relationship with business through, for instance, the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac, a multi-stakeholder structure through which government, labour, business and community organizations come together to find solutions to South Africa’s major socio-economic challenges).

Lastly, public policies in South Africa have largely been influenced by the commitments of the ‘National Democratic Revolution’ alluded to above. These commitments are elaborated in many policy documents of the ANC (such as ANC Strategy and Tactics 2007, National General Council 2005, 52nd National Conference, ANC manifesto for 2009 general elections). Government, through respective structures and policy instruments, translates those noble ideals into implementable programmes of action within respective policy (and political) platform. Always at the core of that programme of action is explicit sense of trade-offs that are being made, almost always reprioritizing human development within an economic growth ‘construct’.

Edigheji (2005) suggests that a democratic developmental state is a state that principally embodies the following four principles: electoral democracy and popular participation in the development and governance processes; economic growth, state driven socio-economic development and ‘embedded autonomy’ as coined by Evans (1995). All of these seem to obtain
in South Africa. Edigheji further emphasizes prevailing institutional arrangements as an important variable to the success of a democratic developmental state, and the South African policy making institutional mechanisms seem sound.

Even with regard to perspectives of leading scholars on developmental states (of East Asia), South Africa seems to have been trying to prioritise economic development. There have been various attempts to get the industrial policy off the ground and it could be argued that the ‘industrial elites’ are under the guidance of the state. The guidance of ‘industrial elites’ has taken various forms, including Presidential Working Groups on business matters. There are elements in the South African state, in the manner in which it determines the developmental agenda and mobilises society, that resembles to some extent Japan as described by Johnson (1982) and Korea as described by Amsden (1989) and Taiwan as described by Evans (1995).

Also drawing from Robinson and White (1998), some salient characteristics – such as ‘institutional coherence’ – of a democratic developmental state seem visible in the South African state. Also, Evan’s (1995) concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ which is central to the effectiveness on a developmental state seems to play itself out in the South African context. Evans (1995) point is that state institutions have to be autonomous in so far as that facilitates the identification and promotion of strategic developmental objectives, while embedded in a sense that the state would be able to establish and sustain working partnerships with key social groups that would add much needed impetus to the achievement of development goals. In the South African context, this appears to be a case in point through the role of the state and its partners. Linked to this is the state’s commitment to ‘meritocratic’ recruitment; the appointment of skilled bureaucrats that would ensure the important political ‘neutrality’ which would in turn facilitate sound networks and delivery on developmental goals. This, however, remains a matter subject to much debate, whether top civil servants are appointed on merit and whether they are insulated from political maneuvers.

The role of the state in the domestic accumulation regime is definitely an important indicator of a trajectory towards a development state. The Reconstruction and Development Program of 1994, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA) of 2006, the Joint
Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) of 2006, the Growth and Development Summit (GDS) of 2003, the National Industrial Policy Framework of 2007, and more recently the New Growth Path of 2010 and the various strategic plans and policy action plans (economic, industrial, international trade and labor) are among many policy instruments that demonstrate political will and dedicated leadership towards building a developmental state. These policy instruments have played a central role in posturing and shaping the interventionist role of the state. However, South African scholars such as von Holdt (2010) have argued that policy reforms are likely to fail if the deficiencies in the institutional architecture of the state bureaucracy are not addressed.

Overall, South Africa as an emerging developmental state has the foundations laid solid. However, the paper will interrogate this assumption further to arrive at a more concrete conclusion as to the correlation between the leading development paradigm and pertinent development outcomes.

4. Organisation and capacity of South Africa’s developmental state

The World Development Report (1997) describes state capacity as the ability of the state to undertake collective actions at least costs to society. This is broader than administrative or technical capacities of civil servants. It entails, also, as the Report puts it, institutional mechanisms that give politicians and civil servants the flexibility, rules, and restraints to enable them to act in the collective interest. This resonates with Cummings and Nørgaard (2004) conceptualisation of state capacity along four dimensions: ideational, political, technical and implementation. Cummings and Nørgaard (2004) define ideational state capacity as the degree to which the state – its actors, role and policies – is legitimated and embedded in state institutions.

Meanwhile, political state capacity refers to the effectiveness of state institutions in terms of governance structures and technical and implementational state capacities refer to administrative capacities.
An issue of public contestation in SA, however, has always been the question around state capacity; whether or not there exists sufficient technical capacity, especially for planning and implementation towards a developmental state. When compared with countries that are said to be developmental states, South Africa’s policy units have been said to have relatively less technocrats.

As indicated above, the organisation of the South African state remains a matter of debate. Some scholars have argued that government is too large. For instance, Luiz (2002) finds it ‘worrisome’ that the proportion of government expenditure going to salaries and wages keeps increasing. Others argue that the amount of technical capacity of government is scarce. For instance, Mhone (2004) argued for ‘nodal or pilot planning super-agency’ as well as more capacity for policy formulation and implementation.

One of the issues that is still highly debated, in the context of capacity and organization of the South African state, is the cluster system referred to above. The cluster system, as discussed above, plays an important role in policy formulation and monitoring and evaluation. It could be argued that the cluster system remains a work-in-progress as it is continually being adjusted in order to address the challenges of the specific administrations in South Africa. The original mandate of clusters include: (1) to harmonise the work of departments and to reduce departmentalism, (2) to produce reports on the implementation of the Programme of Action (PoA), and (3) coordination or oversight over implementation of the PoA.

To some extent there is merit in the argument that the South African developmental state requires additional capacity. The organizational aspects require further consideration. The fundamental question, arguably, is more of whether the systems, such as monitoring and evaluation and performance assessments, are effective in detecting inefficiency and deploying appropriate responses.

Chibber (2002: 952) argues that for any state to be effective, ‘bureaucratic rationality must also be structured in an appropriate apportionment of power among state policy agencies’. In short,
Weberian bureaucracy is not enough just like the bureaucracy based on Confucius’ perspectives was not enough, ‘interagency relations’ are critical. Bureaucratic rationality, if the institutional setting is not supportive, can easily lead to processes that are not developmental or rather effective, as Chibber (2002) found in the case of India.

One conclusion is that South Africa, although with noble and clearly articulated developmental objectives, would naturally encounter significant challenges in its technical and implementation capacities. This is due to the historical and political factors that underpin the evolution of the South Africa state.

The broad ideas that have been discussed thus far on the South African developmental state will be brought into sharper focus in the next section. The next section is an analysis of the status of youth and women within the context of an evolving South African developmental state. The last section will present a conclusion to the overall discussion of the paper.

5. Youth and women in South Africa within the context of a developmental state

South Africa (SA) has many ‘faces’. It is a country of contradictions, paradoxes and ironies. For instance, ‘poverty and degradation exist side by side with modern cities and a developed mining, industrial and commercial infrastructure. Our [South African] income distribution is racially distorted and ranks as one of the most unequal in the world - lavish wealth and abject poverty characterise our [South African] society’ (Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1994).

This unflattering description begs an important question: post 1994, how far has South Africa gone in realising the goals of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) for a truly democratic, prosperous, non-sexist and non-racial society? This question is broad, and requires tailored analyses of different aspects of the post-apartheid South African society and economy. This section of the paper focuses on two groups that make up the majority of South African society and economy: women and youth – how is South African society and economy performing regarding women and youth?

5.1 Broad Overview
To start with, it is widely accepted that South Africa’s democracy is founded on one of the noblest constitutions in the world. As per the precepts of the South African constitution, all the people of South Africa, irrespective of race, religion, creed or any other fault-line are guaranteed human dignity, equality, human rights and freedoms (Constitution of South Africa 1996:30). The state is recognised as having the responsibility to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights’ of everyone in South Africa (Constitution of South Africa 1996:6).

Arguably, since the dawn of democracy, significant amounts of effort by the state and other sectors of society have gone into devising policies and programmes that seek to bring to life these noble ideals (Gumede, 2011). This is the essence of the South African constitution and consequently an expectation that government pursues human development comprehensively from various perspectives: the human rights and other freedoms such as economic, social and cultural ones as well as the expansion of human capabilities in relation to areas such as education and healthcare. The public polices that have been implemented since 1994 can be said to have been deliberate attempts to engender human progress and socio-economic justice broadly (Gumede, 2008). However, many challenges remain. Amongst which is poverty and inequality that effectively translates to social and economic exclusion of certain groups or cohorts. Bhorat and Van der Westhuisen (2010), for an example, conclude that little progress has been made in South Africa in as far as eradicating household poverty and reducing economic inequality are concerned.

The objective of this section of the paper is to explore the extent to which South African public policies have achieved the desired ‘impact’ on women and youth. It is to ask the fundamental question: what do pertinent development outcomes suggest about the South African developmental state? The primary focus of is policy making processes and service delivery in so far as they have been able to generate social and economic capital – the hallmark of human development- for women and youth in particular. The section further examines the extent to which the post-apartheid government has addressed the challenges facing youth and women. The next section presents a short overview of the policy landscape as it pertains to women and youth. The third section analyses progress so far. The fourth section quantitatively examines the
‘welfare’ of women and youth, against rest of South African society. Overall discussions will be drawn into a conclusion following this section.

It is important to indicate, at the outset, that what this analysis tries to do is relatively ambitious and caveats in the methodology warrant a cautious interpretation of the findings. Another important point is that it would appear that some attention needs to be paid to the glaring data gaps in most instances. Most data are for 2008 because the follow-on data which is comparable to the 2008 dataset have yet not been released. For secondary data, there has not been published materials on youth and women post-2008 – with some exception in relation to youth. This is a challenge in itself as it implies that policy making regarding youth and women rely on potentially outdated data and/or analysis in South Africa. This is more so the case for a country that appears to be rapidly changing both in transformation and transition.

5.2. Policy and institutional landscape

As a player in the global multilateral system, South Africa’s policy and programmatic interventions are informed by pertinent global (and continental/regional) policy frameworks. These include a multitude of instruments as devised within the auspices of the United Nations (UN), other international conventions and the African Union.

As such, it would appear that the government of South Africa has implemented many interventions aimed at redressing the legacy of apartheid regarding youth and women, particularly in ensuring their inclusion in the broader society and economy. This should be understood within the historical political context of South Africa – a country that had formal policies and legislation that discriminated against the majority Africans by the white minority.

Since the advent of democracy in 1994, a myriad of legislative and policy instruments have been introduced to improve conditions of Africans. Most of the corrective measures target specific groups. For women, the measures that have been put in place include the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (2000), the National Policy Framework for

For youth, the measures that have been put in place include the National Youth Commission Act (1996), the National Youth Development Framework (2001), the National Youth Policy 2009-2014, the National Youth Service Implementation Plan and the National Youth Service Framework (both designed in 2005), and the National Youth Development Agency Act (2008).

It is also worth highlighting that South Africa has established institutions to coordinate and oversee the implementation of relevant policies across government and social partners to improve the situation of youth and women (Gumede, 2008). Recently, a Ministry for Women, Children and People with Disabilities was formed (in 2009). In the past, there were specific ‘desks’ focusing on youth and women (and for children and for people with disabilities) in the Office of the President under the Thabo Mbeki administration – Thabo Mbeki was president of South Africa during 1999-2008, having served as the Executive Deputy President of South Africa under Nelson Mandela, who was the first black president of a democratic South Africa.

Relevant ‘desks’ were also established across government, with national departments having established specific focal points/units while there has also been independent commissions and parliamentary portfolio/joint monitoring committees regarding youth and women respectively. There have been changes in the institutional architecture over time. The National Youth Commission (the Commission), for instance, was merged with Umsobomvu Youth Fund (the Fund) in 2009 to form the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA). The Commission was dealing with policy and oversight while the Fund was focusing on implementing youth development programmes.

Although the corrective measures (legislative, policy and programmes) named above reflect a serious attempt to advance the cause of the so-called vulnerable groups, it appears that South
Africa has fallen short in implementing these pieces of legislation and policy instruments vigorously enough. In addition, the simple existence of institutions described above does not necessarily translate to an improvement in the ‘welfare’ of women and youth respectively. The next section elaborates and substantiates this problematic.

5.3. Empowerment of women and youth development

According to the Fifteen Year Review (2008), there has been greater access to basic services such as water, sanitation and electricity which has eased the burden on women and girls in executing their household chores. This is believable, to some extent. However, the quality and affordability of such services, especially for the poor cannot go unnoticed for too long. For instance, the increasing number of community formations/groups that illegally connect families to electricity and water services, unchallenged by community members, is instructive. Also, the recent rapid increase in the number of community protests around service delivery (‘service delivery protests’) could be an indication that government is falling short in reaching the poor in general and youth and women (that comprise a significant share of the poor) in particular. Further, informal settlements sprawling around major towns and cities require access to services. The challenge of service delivery is exacerbated by an economy that is performing below par (Gumede, 2011).

A case can be made that access to education and health by youth (and women) has improved in comparison to the period prior to the democratic dispensation. Increased access to education particularly has been facilitated by the policies and programmes such as compulsory education for children aged seven to fifteen years, efforts to foster gender parity in enrolment/participation rates, a No-Fee Schools Policy, Special Needs Education Policy and the National Financial Aid Scheme for tertiary students. The same can be claimed regarding healthcare: the list includes Free Primary Healthcare Policy, Free Antiretroviral Therapy Policy, etc. In housing the list includes initiatives such as Breaking New Ground, Free Housing Policy and so on and so forth.
However, whereas there is more emphasis on improving the quality of education and healthcare for the general population as an example, there remains a serious need for government to improve access thereto for women, youth, children, people with disabilities and the elderly and the indigent generally. With regard to youth, for instance, according to the National Youth Policy (2008:15), young women and men in rural areas face constraints relating to both accessibility to and availability of services and facilities leading to fewer opportunities, limited information and unemployment. This lends itself to various unintended consequences of rampant urban migration which affect the youth and women disproportionately.

At first glance – looking at a plethora of legislation, policies and programmes as well as institutional mechanisms – it appears as though government has successfully facilitated an improved quality of life and human development for youth and women in SA. One of the ways to interrogate the extent of progress in any society, and especially in relation to women and youth, is to examine whether levels of wellbeing are increasing or not – Sen (1993:35) describes wellbeing as ‘person’s being seen from the perspective of her own personal welfare’. From the ‘wellbeing perspective’, the analysis suggests that youth in particular, and women to some extent, are the main losers of the post-apartheid transformation programme. The following sub-sections attempt to unpack the above general statements through critically reflecting on the situation of youth and women respectively.

### 5.3.1 Youth

The youth population in South Africa (those between 14 to 35 years) represents 41.2% of the total population. Those below 15 years comprise 37.7% of the total South African population (Statistics South Africa, 2010). South Africa thus has a bulging youth population; a situation which should inform how the country positions itself in terms of strategies to capitalise on such an opportunity for purposes of national socio-economic development.
This phenomenon is, of course, not confined to South Africa only as is reflected in the population trends of the African continent as a whole. In their assessment of youth in Sub-Saharan labour markets, Leibbrandt and Mlatsheni (2004) affirm that youth are a much larger share of the total population in African countries than they are in other developing countries. They contend such a trend is important as it establishes the fact that youth participation in the labour market is a key labour market issue and also a key development issue in African economies. In the South African case, although a fair share of resources has been directed to youth interventions (education, health, etc), this has not necessarily translated into tangible economic gains for this group (NYDA, 2011:8).

According to the Fifteen Year Review (2008:77), groups such as youth, women, children, the elderly and people with disabilities have benefited from a variety of interventions that facilitate skills development and entry into the labour market, namely; Internship and Learnership Programmes, the National Youth Service, the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) support and others. However, there appears to be a discrepancy between the intentions of policies and outcomes as far as youth development is concerned. In spite of all the youth related policy frameworks and interventions enacted since 1994, young people made up 75% of the unemployed in South Africa in 2008 (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2009:2). More recently, the diagnostic report of the National Planning Commission (NPC) of South Africa indicates that one of the major challenges facing South Africa is that very few people are participating in the economy. Meanwhile the NYDA (2011) contends that about 2.8 million young people between the ages of 19 and 24 years are neither employed nor in an educational institution. Most of these young people do not have the necessary skills to access employment or be involved in sustainable entrepreneurship so the general argument goes.

Using the narrow definition of unemployment\(^1\), the results at the end of 2010 revealed that about 13.13 million people were working in a total population of 19.06 million people who make up

---

\(^1\) The narrow definition, or rather the official definition, of unemployment excludes the so-called discouraged job seekers – these are people who have given up searching for jobs as they have been looking for jobs over many months or even years.
the labour force of South Africa; meaning that 5.96 million people are unemployed (Statistics South Africa, 2010). Startlingly, of the total unemployed, over 70% were youth; those between the ages 15 and 35 years (NYDA, 2011: 65). In addition, the surveys have also indicated the highest age cohort of the unemployed are those between the ages of 15 – 24 years. Meanwhile, this age cohort has the highest proportion of people who have given up looking for a job (Statistics South Africa, 2010).

Arguably, the youth unemployment challenge in South Africa is structural than it is periodic or situational given its persistence against innumerable legislative and programmatic interventions. Important questions then arise around the development capacity of South Africa’s economic policy as well as the sustainability and efficacy of education and training system, the labour laws and industrial policy. The Centre for Development and Enterprise (2009) underscores this point when it contends that although youth unemployment is only part of the deeper unemployment problem in South Africa, unemployed and unskilled young people face more difficulty in finding jobs.

In addition, as already discussed above, unemployment disparately affects various sections of the South African population. Ngcaweni (2005) highlights that South African youth are most negatively affected by the high unemployment rates in the country. He contends that, according to Census 2001 calculations, youth economic participation rates show that almost nine million youth were available for employment. However, of that figure only 50.4% (4, 513, 975) were employed, leaving four million youth unemployed.

Altman (2007) underscores this assertion when she points out that in South Africa youth are twice as likely as adults to be unemployed in South Africa and 75% of those who were unemployed, then, were young people. She provides as reasons for the disproportionate numbers of young unemployed the ‘last in, first out’ convention when jobs were lost; the lack of job search capabilities/networks; the lack of resources to travel in search of work; and the tendency to ‘shop around’ (among better-off youth).
The link between education attainment and employment cannot be overemphasized. For instance, in terms of geographical distribution in 2005, Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Western Cape youth had the highest tertiary achievements. As compared to the Northern Cape, for example, where only 5.5 percent of young people had tertiary qualifications (Ngcaweni, 2005: 28). This could, amongst other factors, explain the relatively higher incidence of youth employment in those provinces than others.

Further, race remains a persistent fault line in South Africa’s youth unemployment trends. Lam et al (2008) indicate that although young people generally have difficulty making the transition from school-to-work, rates of unemployment among the African population are disproportionately high. Further, racial differences surface even before youth finish school as white youth are much more likely than any other group to have worked during the years they are enrolled in school.

The challenge of youth unemployment, effectively translating to the exclusion of the youth in the mainstream of the South African society and the economy, is a significant post-apartheid disappointment. Prior to the administration of Jacob Zuma (and the introduction of the New Growth Path which is unlikely to meet its own set job creation target like the Growth, Employment and Retribution Strategy), there were many other programmes that aimed at bring the youth as well as other groups to the mainstream of the economy and society. This entailed the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA), Joint Initiative to Promote Skills in South Africa (JIPSA), the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), Jobs for Growth, the JOBS programme of the erstwhile Umsobomvu Youth Fund, the South African Graduate Development Association, National Financial Aid Scheme, Second-chances Programme and School to Work Programme, among others.

It is said that through these programmes, more than 20 000 job offers per year were made locally and more than 700 placements were made internationally (Fifteen Year Review 2008:77). Regardless of the angle one adapts to examine these figures they point to a historical inability by
the South African government and partners to sustainably resolve the youth unemployment challenge. Among others, the challenges with these efforts seemed to be with their reach and scale, sustainability and coordination mechanisms as the majority of these programmes require a system whereby government departments and other partners work in an intricate integrated manner. In addition, an unclear strategic intent (i.e. policy) on youth empowerment is arguably a constraint to the inclusion of the youth to the mainstream of the economy and society. Simplistically put, the failure is both in the labour market and the society as a whole. An argument can be made that the two institutions that fail the youth are the public and private sectors – businesses are not creating critical opportunities even for graduates.

By way of encouraging and supporting entrepreneurship amongst the South African population and particularly the youth, government has also created various entities such as the Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA), which was born out of a merger of the various small business development institutions, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), the National Empowerment Fund and Khula Enterprises Finance, among others. The estimated level of youth entrepreneurship (at 33 percent) – though there has not been a systemic institutional review, this low level of youth entrepreneurship implies that the various organizations implementing programmes pertaining to youth development would need to do more to support entrepreneurship (NYDA, 2011:70).

The persistence of other historical challenges facing young people such as the exclusion of the youth in the rural areas and those living with disabilities, those engaged in substance abuse, law-breaking, school drop-outs, those affected by HIV and Aids, etc also play a critical role in subverting the human development of young people. The poor performance of the economy and society on youth development has overtime placed the youth in a helpless condition – the condition in which youth find themselves further limit their chances for bettering their own lives.

It is in this context that an argument is advanced for rethink of policies and programmes regarding the empowerment of the youth and youth development. Arguably, it is not only a
matter of rethink of policies and programmes. It is also, perhaps fundamentally, a matter of designing a sound policy that should inform the institutional architecture and the programmes for the empowerment of the youth and youth development. In addition, critically, is that the various proposals aimed at ameliorating the situation of the youth should be considered thoroughly and with an open mind. The ‘wage subsidy’ programme designed and tested in 2009 is one of the programmes that could bring about the much needed relief for the youth – however debates continue unabated instead of a firm decision on the ‘wage subsidy’ programme. Another policy area that requires attention relates to education and training. A number of scholars, and policy makers, suggest that the unemployment problem in SA is a ‘skills mismatch’ challenge. In other words, the ‘skills’ demanded by the economy are not the ones in supply. This is a challenge, if it is real, that requires both the public and private sectors to address through in-service training and similar programmes because many unemployed youth has some qualification or has been ‘trained’.

5.3.2 Women

According to Statistics South Africa (2010), women make up 51% of South Africa’s estimated population of 49, 99 million people. At the core of government policies on women is a dual strategy aimed at dealing with the legacy of apartheid and the transformation of society, particularly the transformation of power relations between women and men. South Africa’s empowerment of women is about ‘addressing gender oppression, patriarchy, sexism, racism, ageism, and structural oppression, and creating a conducive environment which enables women to take control of their lives’ (CEDAW Report, 2010: 5).

According to Hassim (2005:3), South Africa is considered a developmental welfare state and has inherited the characterisation as ‘the developing world’s largest and most generous welfare state’. Within such, as already outlined above, South Africa’s development and growth policy frameworks are underpinned by an overtone of human rights and the need to empower the so-called vulnerable groups such as women. This is critical as ‘the achievement of sustainable
economic growth and human development rests on women’s equal participation in the economy’ (United Nations Development Fund for Women 2008:16).

Thus, the establishment in 2009 of the Ministry of Women, Children and People with Disabilities and its concomitant Department is celebrated as a major milestone in the quest for the emancipation of women and their empowerment. The Ministry is largely meant to champion the cause of women and ensure alignment amongst government structures and between government and social partners on matters related to the emancipation and development of women.

South Africa has – since 1994 – enjoyed much recognition as an exemplary country in the numbers of women elected to political office (Hassim 2005:4). By 2008, for instance, South Africa had achieved 43% representation in the Cabinet and about 33% in the Legislature including the appointment in 2005 of the first female Deputy President. The representation of women in the South African Parliament has increased from 27.8% in 1994 to 43.3% in 2009. This puts South Africa amongst the leading countries in the world in terms of the number of women in important leadership positions (CEDAW Report, 2010: 8). Such developments would suggest greater mainstreaming of issues of gender equality in policy decisions etc. However, although some progress has been accomplished on women representation in Senior Management in the public service, the low representation of women in corporate decision-making positions in the private sector remains a challenge.

There is universal recognition that women tend to bear the brunt of poverty and/or general hardship. South African women generally experience insufficient earned income due to high levels of unemployment and low wages owing to low levels of skills and education as well as because of gender discrimination (Fifteen Year Review, 2008: 73). The situation is said to be worse for poor women, young women and rural women who, even if employed, find themselves in the worst paid sectors of the labour market such as domestic and retail work (Hassim 2005:4).
In addition, there appears to be a growing trend of female-headed households (and child-headed households) (Fifteen Year Review, 2008).

It should, however, be recognised that women – in particular those that head households and are taking care of children – constitute that largest sector of beneficiaries of government’s social wage: social wage broadly refers to services accessed for free, such as free housing, free water and electricity services, free primary healthcare, etc. In addition, 90% of adult beneficiaries from the child support grants are women between the age of 27 and 33 years (Fifteen Year Review 2008). It is argued that the experience of poverty by women, among other so-called vulnerable groups, is significantly mitigated by the social assistance programme (Fifteen Year Review 2008: 73).

Overall, there are many other indications and indicators in government documentation in particular that suggest that government has made inroads in empowering women. For instance, it is said that girl children stay in schools longer (Office on the Status of Children, 2009:17). Arguments such as this one can be misleading, given the scale of the challenge that South Africa needs to address when it comes to women and girl children – data on gross enrolment rates always need to be treated with circumspect because gross enrolment rates could be high as a result of high repetition rates and not because of high throughput rates (Gumede, 2011).

Another issue that contradicts government documentation is that SA, like many countries in the developing world and Africa in particular, is faced with a general trend of the ‘feminization’ of poverty. The next section discusses calculations that confirm this argument – there are far more women in poverty than men in South Africa. Also, due to their ‘traditional’ household roles, women and girls usually carry the heavy responsibility of walking long distances to fetch water, as an example.
It can be safely argued that the challenges confronting women and girl children have been worsened by the HIV and Aids epidemic. African women are more vulnerable to HIV infection; more women than men are HIV positive and women are likely to contract HIV at a younger age than men Hassim (2005). On its own, this is a dire situation. When met with poverty and other forms of hardship that women endure, this becomes a serious social problem as women are the primary care givers to those infected by HIV and Aids. It, therefore, has palpable implications for the survival of other so-called vulnerable groups such as children, the youth, elderly, etc – thus the social fibre of communities and the country is negatively impacted.

In the light of this, constant calls have been made by various sectors of South African society for the significant improvement in the visibility and effectiveness of constitutional democracy ‘watchdogs’ (especially in relation to Chapter 9 institutions as listed in the South African constitution such as the Human Rights Commission, Commission for Gender Equality and the Public Protector). Relevant Chapter 9 institutions are mainly located in the major cities, as one case in point. It can be argued that more citizens, especially women, should be aware of the local corresponding offices in their localities so that they may access relevant information, resources and assistance. Another critical point is that the recommendations of these institutions to the government are only advisory as opposed to binding encourages the tendency of the government to choose to heed or ignore recommendations in the absence of litigation (Loots, 2007). As it stands, the current institutional arrangements significantly limit women’s access to justice and related services such as rape counselling.

Another major challenge in relation to violence against women (and children) remains stark. Although campaigns have been introduced to raise awareness and prevent the incidence of gender-based and child directed violence, there is an apparent reluctance by society to rid itself of these ills. According to the Fifteen Year Review (2008:78), reported rape cases per 100 000 of the population only began to decrease in 2005/06. The harassment of particularly young women who are perceived as not conforming to the values held by some sectors of society is equally an
indictment to the post-apartheid democratic society while women also generally stand a risk of being persecuted and ostracised by society during rape court cases.

Related to this is the difficulty that is faced by women, especially those living in the rural areas, in accessing and benefiting from the criminal justice system. Although South Africa has campaigns such as Access to Justice Week and 16 Days of Activism Against Violence to Women and Children, a lot more energy need to go to similar initiatives so as to ensure that they achieve their intended objectives of universal justice for all. There is also persistent failure by government and the private sector to reach the target of 50% representation of women in executive and senior management levels (Fifteen Year Review Report 2008:72).

Other challenges have been highlighted by the Commission for Gender Equality. With the establishment of the Ministry for Women, Children and Persons with disabilities, the Commission has observed that there is need to restructure the national gender machinery. It’s proposed that there is a need to amend the gender policy Framework so as to clarify the role of the Ministry.

Arguably, through a thorough application of the ‘gender budget analysis’ – which is originally a United Nations tool to assess the impact of budgetary revenues and expenditures on gender equality and empowerment of women – countries such as SA could improve their efforts towards enhanced life opportunities for women. The picture pertaining to the rights and empowerment of women in South Africa is not a good one, though many argue that South Africa is an example to the world on these issues. There are many social injustices visited on women in South Africa that are not reported or the society seems to be keeping a blind eye on them. For instance, LGBT issues (Lesbians, gays, Bisexuals, and transsexuals) do not seem to be adequately addressed as stigma and hate crimes continue to be directed at affected individuals. Existing education and awareness campaigns on the human rights of these individuals seem to be failing.
The next section attempts to quantify the poor state of ‘welfare’ of women (and the youth) in South Africa.

5.4 Human development of women and youth

This section briefly discusses estimations pertaining to human development in South Africa, primarily using the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) dataset. The NIDS is an integrated dataset which permits estimation of comparative human development across subgroups and/or cohorts, and it allows calculation of relative human development at different points in the income distribution – something that has not been done, at least for South Africa, before. It is in this context that the NIDS is used. At this stage, because the NIDS data were collected in 2008, the analysis focuses on 2008\textsuperscript{2}. At the time of finalising this paper, the second Wave data (which was collected in 2011) were being processed – the NIDS was conceptualised as a longitudinal/panel study whereby original household members would be surveyed every two to three years. The NIDS is a nationally representative household survey or was for 2008.

Because the NIDS survey did not collect information on adult literacy as it merely asked all interviewees about their highest level of educational attainment, Statistics South Africa’s data\textsuperscript{3} from the 2005/6 Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) is used to estimate correlation coefficients between educational attainment and an indicator variable on whether a person can read, including age and gender variables, in order to assess the various developmental aspects pertaining to women and youth respectively. The derived correlation coefficients are used to predict literacy levels.

\textsuperscript{2} The NIDS dataset contains information on more than 28 000 individuals in 7 305 households across South Africa, and has detailed information on expenditure, income, employment, schooling, health, social cohesion, etc (http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/home).

\textsuperscript{3} Statistics South Africa is the official statistical agency for South Africa
In a nutshell, human development is the process of enlarging people’s choices as well as raising their levels of wellbeing. The human development process in South Africa, therefore, is about an overall improvement in the quality of life of the people of South Africa. The human development measures are better placed to capture the desired improvement in quality of life. There is a Human Development Index (HDI) and a Human Poverty Index (HPI, for developing countries it is notated by HPI-1) remains useful measures of human development.

Unlike conventional poverty indicators that focus narrowly on household income or consumption data, the various components of the HDI and HPI as well as those of other related indices indicate progress in the various social and economic indicators that capture some aspects of welfare. Over and above the HDI and the HPI there is a Gender-related Human Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). Global HDI estimates range from 0.34 (in Niger) to 0.97 (in Norway); higher values represent higher levels of human development (Human Development Report, 2011). The HDI is calculated by first creating an index of all the three (life expectancy, education and income) dimensions (while the HPI-1 combines measures of life expectancy, child nutrition status and access to improved water sources, and income). To calculate the HDI each dimension is taken and its performance is apportioned to a value between 0 and 1 by using equation 1 below (Human Development Report, 2011):

\[
\text{Dimension index} = \frac{\text{actual value} - \text{minimum value}}{\text{maximum value} - \text{minimum value}} \tag{1}
\]

The actual value is the real observed quantity for that particular dimension and minimum value represents the minimum possible quantity that can be observed (e.g. in the case of life expectancy it would be the average life expectancy in South Africa, whereas on income it would be the minimum value of the adjusted GDP per capita\(^4\)). The HDI is then computed by averaging the three dimensions as shown in equation 2 below (Human Development Report, 2011):

\[
\text{HDI} = \frac{\text{life expectancy index} + \text{education index} + \text{GDP index}}{3} \tag{2}
\]

\(^4\) For a detailed analysis of how to calculate the various dimensions and indices, see the Human Development Report (2011).
Global HPI-1 estimates range from a high of 59.8 (in Afghanistan) to a low of 1.5 (in the Czech Republic) (Human Development Report, 2011). To calculate HPI-1, the following equation is used:

\[ \text{HPI-1} = \left[ \frac{1}{3} \left( P_{1}^\alpha + P_{21}^\alpha + P_{3}^\alpha \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{3}} \]

where \( P_{1}^\alpha \) = Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (times 100), \( P_{2}^\alpha \) = Adult illiteracy rate, \( P_{3}^\alpha \) = Unweighted average of population not using an improved water source and children under the weight-for-age, \( \alpha = 3 \).

The GDI reflects differences in HDI for women compared to men. Like the HDI, the calculation of the GDI is a three step process. The first step involves using equation 1 to calculate female and male life expectancy indices and then combining them in a way that penalises any differences in achievements amongst the two groups. The second step involves a computation of the equally distributed education index for each cohort and then combined in a way that penalises any differences amongst the two. In the third step, the equally distributed income index is calculated for both sexes, after which the male and female indices are combined to create the equally distributed income index.

The GDI is simply the unweighted average of the three indices above (i.e. equally distributed life expectancy, education and income indices) and is calculated as shown in equation 3 below (Human Development Report, 2011):

\[ GDI = \frac{1}{3} (\text{life expectancy index}) + \frac{1}{3} (\text{education index}) + \frac{1}{3} (\text{income index}) \]

The GEM focuses on the opportunities given to women than what they can do themselves. It combines measures of equality in political, economic power and power over resources for men.
and women. Global GDI estimates range from 0.31 (in Sierra Leone) to 9.99 (in Sweden) (Human Development Report, 2011). To calculate the GEM, first an equally distributed equivalent percentage (EDEP) is calculated. This is then followed by an introduction of a variable that necessitates the penalisation of any inequalities is introduced, which is lastly followed by a careful indexing of the EDEP value by 50 (for a 50% representation between sexes in an ideal society). This three step process is repeated to calculate all the EDEPs for all the three dimensions, namely: parliamentary representation, economic participation and income. The GEM is then calculated by averaging the three indexed EDEPs by following equation 4 below:

\[
GEM = \frac{\text{Indexed EDEP for parliamentary representation} + \text{Indexed EDEP for economic participation} + \text{Indexed EDEP for income}}{3}
\]

Table 1 below shows the estimations of selected calculations such as life expectancy, adult illiteracy, headcount poverty, human development and human poverty. The focus is on those aspects of the HDI and the HPI-1 that are relevant for women and youth in particular.

Table 1: Estimates of life expectancy, adult illiteracy, headcount poverty, HDI and HPI-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Life expectancy [years]</th>
<th>Illiteracy rates [%]</th>
<th>Below poverty line [%]</th>
<th>HDI</th>
<th>HPI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>27.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poorest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>39.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-40%</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>36.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poorest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-60%</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>0.586</td>
<td>32.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poorest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-40%</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.674</td>
<td>22.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>richest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td>17.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>richest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The glaring point demonstrated by Table 1 is that the poor are far worse than the national averages whilst the rich are better than the national averages. Table 1 also shows those living below the poverty line (of R502 per capita – this is the same figure used in the Fifteen Year Review, 2008). The national average of those living below the poverty line is 47%. The HPI-1 on the other hand, which is an index instead of a headcount of those falling below a money-metric poverty line, is 27.09 for South Africa as a whole, but only 17.29 for the richest 20% whilst it is 39.97 for the poorest 20%. For the HDI, the richest 20% has a far higher HDI (i.e. 0.87) compared to the poorest 20% (0.49). Similarly, the richest 20% live 20 years more than the average.

There are many estimations and technical assumptions that inform Table 1. In addition, there are some complex calculations that could be worth mentioning. The *life expectancy measure*, as an example, is an estimate of the average number of years to be lived by a group of people born in the same year, if mortality at each age remains constant in the future. Life expectancy was reached by calculating the average change of dying at each age, based on age specific mortality rates, and then aggregated these age specific mortality rates to expected years of living. As an example, if 10% of all one year olds were reported to have died in a particular year, the age specific mortality rate is 10%. If, in addition to that, 5% of all 2 year olds and 5% of all 3 year olds died, there is 18.8% chance of dying by the age of 3 years. Based on similar calculations for all age groups, average life expectancies were estimated.

With regards to *education*, it was measured by two statistics: adult literacy rates and gross school enrolment for primary, secondary and tertiary education. The NIDS survey did not collect information on adult literacy but asked all participants about their highest level of educational attainment. While a small number of people may learn to read without formal education, attainment of at least grade 2 educational level is a good predictor of reading levels. As indicated above, Statistics South Africa’s data from the 2005/6 Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) was used to estimate correlation coefficients between educational attainment and an indicator variable on whether a person can read, including age and gender variables. The derived
correlation coefficients were used to predict literacy levels in the NIDS dataset, based on observations on educational attainment.

*Living standards* are generally captured through the income measure using GDP per capita. Based on Statistics South Africa national income and mid-year population estimates and World Bank Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) conversion rates GDP per capita in 2008 was $10,109. This level of income was adjusted to variations across gender, race and provinces using household income averages.

*Gender specific earnings*, on the other hand, were calculated as a measure of the share of income earned by women compared to the share earned by men. Individual earnings data from non-agricultural income sources were used. This includes all formal, secondary, private enterprises and casual jobs that are non-agricultural. Given that social grants make up about 10% of women’s income, as shown by the NIDS data, state transfers were included in the calculations in order to provide as complete as possible picture of gender-related earnings.

Lastly, let me highlight some of the insightful estimations behind Table 1 above. It was found, for instance, that the black population group has the lowest life expectancy rate of all population groups – blacks live for 45 years, while coloureds live for 62 years and whites live for 74 years (the sample for Indians is rather small to make conclusive estimations for this population group). It was also found that almost 10% of South African adults cannot read. Women are more than 2 percentage points more likely to be illiterate than men, and blacks are more likely than other population groups to be illiterate. It was also found that men earn, on average, R2,745 per month or more than twice the average female non-agricultural earnings. It was also found that girl children are more than twice as likely to be underweight than boys.

Because the NIDS collected information directly from households, some of the assumptions that can be controversial might not apply. That said, the issue of life expectancy remains the most debatable as it is one number that significantly influences the HDI in a country like SA. It is in this context that further rigorous examination of estimations and assumptions is important. Given
that NIDS is a longitudinal survey – data is collected every two to three years, from same respondents – there is scope for continuously testing assumptions made and application of some technical tests overtime in order to ensure the accuracy of the findings. There is also scope for further incisive analyses, by any researcher interested, in order to better capture the state of women and youth in SA on an ongoing basis.

6. Concluding remarks

The point made in this paper is that, except for relative progress in relation to women empowerment, it would seem that the society and economy are not doing well enough in relation to youth development. Broadly, the so-called targeted groups are disproportionately affected by the general poor quality of social services in the country as a whole. The various human development indicators and those reported in other publications discussed in this paper show that poor people, who are mostly the vulnerable groups, remain worse off compared to rich people.

In essence, although social and economic inclusion has been broadened, the challenges faced by youth in particular and women to a large extent remain severe. The rate of youth unemployment, for instance, is testimony that government has a lot of work ahead if society and economy are to effectively deal with this social challenge. Arguably, with the exception of political representation at national level, there is still reluctance by society to accept women in particular as fully capable and resourceful beings. Lastly, the extent to which policies and programmes aimed at the youth and women have impacted on human development is contestable.

The service delivery protests that are characterising what could be termed South Africa’s ‘third transition’⁵ are a warning to the country that more needs to be done speedily to include the excluded. This also means dealing with the gap between the rich and the poor. What happened during the third transition therefore was the realization by those largely excluded in the South

---

⁵ The third transition term refers to the period prior and right after the third general election of a democratic South Africa (roughly 2007 – 2010)
African economy and society that they are the losers in the democratic South Africa, at least so far. Women and especially youth appear to be the main losers. As argued in this paper, the challenge could be with policy, the economy and the labour market. Therefore, a possible answer should be multifaceted.

Arguably, overall, South Africa as an emerging developmental state has the foundations laid solid in terms of a clearly articulated development paradigm translated into policy. Clearly, the state has made maximum use of the means at its disposal for developmental objectives including the programmes of development finance institutions and regulatory bodies, through government procurement and public incentive in industrial, trade, competition, labor market and other policies as well as in the ‘new’ approach in the management of public enterprises. The South African government has often used its fiscal strengths, its financial regulatory frameworks, and the resourcefulness of its people and institutions to give concrete expression to the development state as a way of responding to systematic development challenges.

However, one salient, yet discouraging conclusion is that South Africa has not been a very effective (developmental) state owing to its technical and implementational state capacity. This does not imply that the state should be organised differently, though coordination could be further ameliorated. It means that the capacity that was said to be lacking, such as long-term planning expertise, should be created. As Gumede (2007) argued, in government there are ‘various planning instruments and tools mainly focused on medium-term planning, not long-term developmental planning’. The new planning function in government is meant to close this gap and others, such as further improving coordination. Beyond strengthening coordination and implementation capacities as well as long-term planning, there appears to be a policy chasm that limits the pace of the creation of an effective South African developmental state.
References


* Contributions from Gcino Mlaba are acknowledged. This paper is not to be quoted without the permission of the corresponding author (gumede.vusi@gmail.com)